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Under Article 353 of the Civil Code the tutor may not enter
into a compromise respecting the rights of the minor without
authority from the judge.' May the father of a child subject to
paternal authority compromise the minor's claims without ob-
taining permission from the judge, or must he too secure that
permission? The answer given in Blades v. Southern Farm Bu-
reau Casualty Insurance Company2 is that the father may act
alone. Perhaps this is as the rule should be, but as an interpre-
tation of the legislation this decision is questionable. The only
legislative provisions on the authority of the father in the ad-
ministration of the minor's property during the existence of pa-
ternal authority are Articles 221 and 222 of the Civil Code. The
first merely places the administration of the child's property in
the father except in the event of his interdiction or absence. The
second, which the court made the basis of its decision, reads in
part: "Property belonging to minors [under paternal authority]
may be sold or mortgaged, and any other step may be taken af-
fecting their interest, in the same manner and by pursuing the
same forms as in case of minors represented by tutors, the father
occupying the place and being clothed with the powers of the
tutor." The court construed this article to apply to only "the
sale or mortgaging and similar transactions affecting the prop-
erty of a minor" and not to a compromise of a minor's claim for
personal injuries. With this interpretation the writer cannot
agree, for the words "and any other step may be taken affect-
ing their interest" certainly cannot be construed to refer to the
interests of the property of the minor and must refer to the in-
terest of the minor. The word "their" is a personal pronoun and
must not have been used in reference to inanimate objects.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The article refers to advice of the family meeting, and therefore under the
new procedure the undertutor must agree or there must be proceedings contra-
dictorily with him. LA. R.S. 9:651-653 (1950).
2. 237 La. 1, 110 So.2d 116 (1959).
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In the.court's opinion :the fact that Article 222 was not in the
Civil Code of 1825 was relied upon as an indication that some-
time between 1825 and 1870 it must have come to be felt that
acts relating to property were "beyond mere administration"
and therefore ought not to be made on the father's sole judg-
ment. The writer is of the opinion that the article was inserted
into the Revised Civil Code of 1870 for another reason. In the
Civil Code of 1825 the article on the administration by the father
during paternal authority (the present Article 221) appeared
in the section on tutorship by nature.8 The section on paternal
authority did not contain any provision on the subject. Evident-
ly in 1825 it Was intended that the father administer as if a
tutor, following the rules on tutorship. In 1845, however, the
decision in Cleveland v. Sprowl4 declared that the father need
not qualify as a tutor during paternal authority and probably in-
troduced doubts as to the manner in which the father should ad-
minister the property of the minor. But if any doubts on this
score; had been introduced by Cleveland v. Sprowl, they should
have been removed by Act 324 of 1855. That act treated ex-
tensively of the administration by tutors but contained, in its
Section 17, the new legislation which later was incorporated into
the Revised Civil Code of 1870 as Article 222. Its position in Act
324 of 1855 and its wording indicate to this writer that the fa-
ther, although not required to qualify as tutor under the decision
in Cleveland v. Sprowl, was expected to act in the same manner
as a tutor in the administration of the child's affairs; and there
is nothing to indicate that the draftsmen of the Revised Civil
Code of 1870 intended to give it another meaning.
In reaching its decision in the above case the court also
placed some reliance on.Darlington v. Turner.5 That case, it will
be recalled, was similar to Cleveland v. Sprowl and involved no
more than the question whether during paternal authority the
father could accept a legacy given to his child without qualifying
as tutor and posting security. The answer was given in the af-
firmative, consistently with the earlier decision. But in no way
did that case raise the question which is raised in the instant
case. Under Article 354 of the Civil Code the tutor may accept
legacies for his ward acting alone and without the assistance of
the undertutor or authorization of the judge; hence the father
S. LA. CIVM CODE art. 267 (1825).
4. 12 Rob. 172 (La. 1845).
5. 202 U.S. 195 (1906).
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during paternal authority would not be required to seek such
assistance or authorization, for under Article 222 he is subject
to the same rules as is the tutor. But under Article 353 the. tutor
needs authorization of court to enter into a compromise of-the
minor's claims; hence had the case of Darlington v. Turner in-
volved such a matter the father no doubt would not have been
allowed to act without the authorization of the judge.
For the several reasons given above the writer cannot agree
with the decision in the Blades case. He can and does agree, how-
ever, that in the light of the jurisprudence a legislative clarifi-
cation of the powers of the father is necessary.
Filiation
State v. Braxton" was a prosecution for neglect of family, the
neglected persons being an illegitimate child and the accused be-
ing charged as its father. Though Article 74 of the Criminal
Code itself purports to impose the obligation of support and to
permit the filiation of the neglected child and the accused to be
established at the time of trial, previous decisions of the Su-
preme Court have denied the constitutionality of these provisions
and require proof of a civil obligation of support at the time of
the alleged neglect. 7 Under Article 242 of the Civil Code the
father who has acknowledged his illegitimate child owes it sup-
port, and under Article 203 of the Civil Code the acknowledg-
ment may be made in an act before a notary public and two wit-
nesses or "in the registering of the birth or baptism of the
child." The accused in the instant case had signed the child's
birth registration as its father and the state introduced the orig-
inal act of registry into evidence as an act of acknowledgment.
The accused was convicted, but on appeal the conviction was re-
versed. The Supreme Court did not seem to deny that the ac-
cused's .signature of the birth registration constituted an ac-
knowledgment under Article 203 of the Civil Code, but based its
decision on R.S. 40:159. According to this statute, a part of the
vital statistics legislation, the "data" in the original registry of
birth "pertaining to the father of the child" is only "prima facie
evidence" against the "alleged father" in any civil or criminal
proceeding if he is or later becomes the husband of the mother,
but "not much evidence" against an "alleged father" not then or
6. 238 La. 13, 113 So.2d 292 (1959).
7. State v. Hubbard, 228 La. 155, 81 So.2d 844 (1955) ; State v. Mack, 224
La. 886, 71 So.2d 315 (1954).
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later the husband of the mother, his heirs, legatees, or successors
in interest, "if the paternity is controverted." The majority
opinion, written by the late Justice Ponder, interpreted this
legislation to mean that the birth registry could not be intro-
duced into evidence in the case if the child's paternity was con-
troverted, and apparently considered the paternity of the child
to be in dispute. Justice McCaleb dissented on the ground that
the provisions of Article 74 of the Civil Code establishing the
obligation of support and permitting proof of filiation at the
trial ought to be given effect and, secondly, that under R.S.
40:159 the birth registry could be introduced as evidence of the
filiation, though it could not be considered "prima facie" evi-
dence.
On the proper interpretation of R.S. 14:74 the writer has
said enough on a previous occasion and the discussion need not
be repeated here.8 As to the second ground in Justice McCaleb's
opinion, a reading of the statute, R.S. 40:159, is enough to con-
vince one that he is correct. But it may be questioned whether
R.S. 40:159 was applicable at all. This statute certainly did not
purport to amend the laws on acknowledgment, and under Ar-
ticle 203 it would seem that the signature of a birth registry as
parent of the child constitutes an acknowledgment. Hence it
could be argued, at least, that the state had not sought to intro-
duce a birth registry as such, but rather an act of acknowledg-
ment which happened to be on the birth registry of the child.
Besides, it might also be argued that if such a signature consti-
tutes an acknowledgment then the filiation of the child had been
established as a matter of law before the prosecution, and indeed
before the neglect, and therefore could not be considered "con-
troverted" at the time of the trial. Beyond this, however, there
is at least serious doubt that R.S. 40:159 should be construed to
apply to registrations of birth signed by the defendant or ac-
cused as parent of the child. Under R.S. 40:304, which also is
part of the vital statistics legislation and which was originally
part of the same act from which R.S. 40:159 was taken,9 the pri-
mary obligation for making reports of births falls on the phy-
sician, midwife, or other person in attendance at the birth; only
if the birth is unattended is a parent obliged to register it. Thus
8. See the writer's appraisal of State v. Hubbard, 228 La. 155, 81 So.2d 844
(1955), in 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVImw 224-26 (1956).
9. The pertinent part of LA. R.S. 40:159 and 40:304 (1950) were originally
Sections 12 and 25 of Act 180 of 1942.
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R.S. 40:159 would seem to have been written on the assumption
that the birth registry would not have been signed by the father
of the child. For these several reasons the writer believes the
conclusion reached in State v. Braxton could have been avoided;
and because it works a most unexpected, and, indeed, probably
unwise change in the law of acknowledgment, it would seem that
it should have been avoided and should be overruled at the first
opportunity.
Custody
Most of the decisions on custody of children involved ques-
tions of fact only.'0 The one decision which would have required
comment, that in State ex rel. Paul v. Peniston," appeared in
time to be considered in last year's symposium article1 2 and need
not be discussed again.
Alimony Due to Children
Worthy of recognition is the decision in Laiche v. Laiche.1"
A divorced father, whose alimentary obligation toward his chil-
dren had been fixed by judgment, remarried and then claimed a
reduction in the alimony payable to his children by reason of his
changed circumstances. The evidence showed that even with the
amounts received from the father the children were in a destitute
or nearly destitute condition. The court refused to reduce the
payments on the ground that one cannot be relieved of alimen-
tary obligations simply because he has reduced his ability to pay
by voluntarily incurring additional obligations. Properly under-
stood the decision is just and wise. The court has decided before
that one might not obtain a reduction in alimony if he reduces his
income for the purpose of placing himself in inability to pay, 4
but it has also decided that one is not prevented from changing his
occupation simply because his income, and therefore his ability
to pay, might be reduced.15 The principle of good faith is enough
to justify the first of those decisions, and the second is perfectly
understandable as long as the reduced payments are sufficient
10. Hathorn v. Hathorn, 237 La. 554, 111 So.2d 770 (1959) ; Butler v. Hurel,
236 La. 1039, 109 So.2d 910 (1959) ; State in interest of Peters, 236 La. 799, 109
So.2d 99 (1959) ; Drouin v. Hilderbrand, 235 La. 810, 105 So.2d 532 (1958).
• U. 235 La. 579, 105 So.2d 228 (1958).
12. 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIw 304, 305 (1959).
13. 237 La. 298, 111 So.2d 120 (1959).
14. Zaccaria v. Beoubay, 213 La. 782, 35 So.2d 659, (1948).
15. Butterworth v. Butterworth, 203 La. 465, 14 So.2d 59 (1943).
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for the maintenance and support of the dependent. But can one
be considered justified in voluntarily decreasing his income (or
assuming additional obligations) if his alimony payments are
not:sufficient to support the dependent? To maintain the af-
firmative would be to deny the obligation itself. Thus the de-
cision, in the writer's opinion, should be taken to mean that one
may not obtain the reduction of his alimentary obligations be-
yond the point of adequacy for the dependent by voluntarily re-
ducing his ability to pay.
The decision in White v. Morris,16 however, is one with which
the writer cannot. agree. There it was declared that an alimony
award in favor of children made in a judgment of separation
was cancelled by a judgment of divorce between these parents
which simply made no provision for alimony. The writer ex-
pressed his views on this subject in reviewing a similar case de-
cided three years ago and they need not be repeated here. 7
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
In Roy v. Board of Commissioners' a claim was made for
property on Lake Pontchartrain which had been appropriated
for levee purposes. The private ownership interests and limita-
tions in riparian property depend primarily on the legal classi-
fication of the adjacent or superjacent body of water (i.e., river,
lake, sea, etc.; navigable or non-navigable). While the immediate
case resulted in a remand for further facts essential to final
determination, the court made the statement: "It is immaterial
whether the property be classified as sea shore, which, being
common property, belongs to no one in particular and is insus-
ceptible of private ownership, or as the bed of a navigable lake,
ownership to which is vested in the state up to the high-water
mark, since in either event plaintiff would not be entitled to
compensation. ' '2
There have been conflicting opinions concerning the classi-
16. 236 La. 767, 109 So.2d 87 (1959).
17. See the writer's remarks on the decision in Thornton v. Floyd, 229 La.
237, 85 So.2d 499 (1956), in 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 311-13 (1957).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 237 La. 541, 111 So.2d 765 (1959).
2. Id. at 550, 111 So.2d at 768 (court's footnotes omitted).
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